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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
pretenses; ii confidence game violation, or any of several other
offenses which have been cumulated in the single crime of theft.25
Considering the court's approval in the Straughan case of the
use of the short form indictment in cases involving theft, aggra-
vated rape, manslaughter, simple burglary, and murder, it would
appear that the Straughan decision does not preclude the use of
the short form to charge well-understood crimes, even though
they may be susceptible of commission in a number of ways. On
the other hand, the decision precludes any use of the super-abbre-
viated short form authorized by the 1944 amendment, which per-
mitted the use of such indictments for charging crimes of a
multifarious nature, such as gambling or obscenity which do not
have a well-understood nature and cause. For charging these
latter crimes, it will be necessary to use the form of indictment
prescribed by article 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that
is to say, that "the indictment must state every fact and circum-
stance necessary to constitute the offense, but it need do no more,
and it is immaterial whether the language of the statute creating
the offense, or words unequivocally conveying the meaning of
the statute be used. ' '2
Thomas D. Hardeman
LEGISLATION - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - REQUIREMENT THAT
EACH BILL MUST BE READ ON THREE DIFFERENT DAYS
IN EACH HOUSE
Plaintiff alleged the unconstitutionality of an act of the
Louisiana Legislature' on the ground that it had not been read
on three different days in each House of the Legislature as re-
quired by article III, section 24, of the Louisiana Constitution.2
The Journal indicates that the bill was read on only two days in
the Senate, twice on the day it was received from the House
and again when it was passed the next day. Defendant contended
that the bill was valid nonetheless, arguing that the constitu-
tional provision is not mandatory and that a presumption of
compliance with the Constitution should control. 3 On appeal
25. LA. R.S. 14:67 (1950). See Morrow, The 19112 Louisiana Criminal Code
in 1945: A Small Voice from the Past, 19 TUL. L. REv. 483 (1945) ; Ralston, Suf-
ficiency of the Charge in an Indictment in Louisiana, 20 TUL. L. REV. 220 (1946).
26. LA. R.S. 15:227 (1950).
1. La. Acts 1954, No. 536, p. 1001, incorporated as LA. R.S. 47:2190 (1950).
2. "Every bill shall be read on three different days in each house .... " (Em-
phasis added.) LA. CONST. art. III, § 24.
3. Both of these contentions were made by defendant in his brief, but the court
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from a judgment sustaining the plaintiff's position, the Supreme
Court held, affirmed. The act is void because violative of ar-
ticle III, section 24 of the Louisiana Constitution. The fact that
the irregularity in the legislative process is shown by the Senate
Journal is not noted in the opinion. Doll v. New Orleans, 229
La. 277, 85 So.2d 514 (1956).
Louisiana's Constitution provides two types of safeguards
in connection with the enactment of legislation - those concern-
ing the form and content of the acts,4 and those dealing with
the required steps in the legislative process. 5 In the application
of these safeguards, the court has been reluctant to consider
events in the life of a bill before it became an act.6 Since no such
consideration is necessary when the defect appears on the face
of the act, the court has not hesitated to invalidate acts deficient
in form and content.7  However, if the constitutional require-
ments as to the legislative procedure are to be enforced by the
court at all, it must consider some evidence other than the final
act. In two early cases8 the Louisiana courts applied the ma-
jority or "enrolled bill" rule, that if an enrolled bill is properly
authenticated by the signatures of the presiding officers of each
branch of the Legislature, the courts will conclusively presume
that all constitutional requirements concerning legislative pro-
cedure have been met.9 However, subsequent Louisiana cases 10
commented only on the argument that the constitutional provision is directory and
not mandatory. Doll v. New Orleans, 229 La. 277, 279, 85 So.2d 514, 515 (1956).
. 4. The principal requirements dealing with the form and content of the act are
that every statute enacted by the Legislature shall embrace but a single object
which shall be indicated by its title and that each act must have an enacting
clause. LA. CONST. art. III, §§ 6, 16.
5. See notes 12-15, 19-23 supra.
6. Bethlehem Supply Co. v. Pan-Southern Petroleum Corp., 207 La. 149, 20
So.2d 737 (1945) ; Wall v. Close, 203 La. 345, 14 So.2d 19 (1943) ; State ex rel.
Porterie v. Smith, 184 La. 263, 166 So. 72 (1936) ; Hollingsworth v. Thompson,
45 La. Ann. 222, 12 So. 1 (1893) ; Whited v. Lewis, 25 La. Ann. 568 (1873) ;
Louisiana State Lottery Co. v. Richoux, 23 La. Ann. 743 (1871). See also 1
SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 1403, 1406 (3d ed. 1943).
7. LA. CONST. art. III, § 16: Conelly v. Shreveport, 216 La. 78, 43 So.2d 223
(1949) ; Ariey v. Tugwell, 197 La. 982, 3 So.2d 99 (1941) ; State v. Louisiana
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 169 La. 167, 124 So. 769 (1929) ; Swan v. Gayle, 21 La.
Ann. 478 (1869). LA. CONST. art. III, § 7: O'Rourke v. O'Rourke, 69 So.2d 567
(La. App. 1954).
8. Whited v. Lewis, 25 La. Ann. 568 (1873) ; Louisiana State Lottery Co. v.
Richoux, 23 La. Ann. 743 (1871).
9. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892) ; State ex rel. Cline v.
Schricker, 228 Ind. 41, 88 N.E.2d 746 (1949) ; Carlton v. Grimes, 237 Iowa 912,
23 N.W.2d 883 (1946). For extensive collection of cases, see 1 SUTHERLAND,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 1403 (3d ed. 1943); CRAWFORD, STATUTORY CON-
STRUCTION § 139 (1940).
10. Bethlehem Supply Co. v. Pan-Southern Petroleum Corp., 207 La. 149, 20
So.2d 737 (1945) ; State ex rel. Porterie v. Smith, 184 La. 263, 166 So. 72 (1936)
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have repudiated this rule, adopfing in its stead the "journal
entry" rule under which the courts will look to the official
journals of the legislative bodies as well as the enrolled bill, but
to no other evidence, in determining whether or not the require-
ments of this type of constitutional provision have been com-
plied with."
In applying the "journal entry" rule it should be borne in
mind that the provisions of the Louisiana Constitution dealing
with the legislative process fall into two groups - those which
require that the fact of compliance with their mandate be proved
by a journal entry and those which do not. Those which require
that the fact of compliance must be shown in the Journal are:
(1) that amendments made by the House in which the act did
not originate must be concurred in by a majority of the elected
members of the originating House ;12 (2) that the report of the
conference committee approving the act must be adopted by a
majority of the elected members of each House ;13 (3) that each
act must receive a final affirmative vote of a majority of the
elected members of each House ;14 and (4) that every enrolled
bill shall be signed by the presiding officer of each House in
open session.'5 As to these requirements the courts hold that
the Journal must show compliance, or the act is void.'6 Whether
the Journal shows compliance or non-compliance it forms con-
clusive proof of the legislative proceedings and no extrinsic evi-
dence is admissible to contradict it.' 7 Even the silence of the
State v. Bauman, 148 La. 743, 87 So. 732 (1921) ; Hollingsworth v. Thompson, 45
La. Ann. 222, 12 So. 1 (1893) ; State em rel. Morris v. Mason, 43 La. Ann. 590,
9 So. 776 (1891).
11. Neiberger v. McCullough, 253 Ill. 312, 97 N.E. 660 (1912) ; People ex rel.
Wies v. Bowman, 247 Ill. 276, 93 N.E. 244 (1910) ; McClellan v. Stein, 229 Mich.
203, 201 N.W. 209 (1924) ; Bull v. King, 205 Minn. 427, 286 N.W. 311 (1939) ;
State v. Heston, 137 W.Va. 375, 71 S.E.2d 481 (1952). See also 1 SUTHERLAND,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 1406 (3d ed. 1943); CRAWFORD, STATUTORY CON-
STRUCTION § 140 (1940).
12. LA. CONST. art. III, § 25.
13. Ibid.
14. 1d. § 24.
15. Id. § 26.
16. Bethlehem Supply Co. v. Pan-Southern Petroleum Corp., 207 La. 149, 20
So.2d 737 (1945) ; Wall v. Close, 203 La. 345, 14 So.2d 19 (1943) ; State ex rel.
Porterie v. Smith, 184 La. 263, 166 So. 72 (1936) ; State v. Joseph, 139 La. 734,
72 So. 188 (1916); State ex rel. Caillouet v. Laiche, 105 La. 84, 29 So. 700
(1901) ; Hollingsworth v. Thompson, 45 La. Ann. 222, 12 So. 1 (1893) ; State
ex rel. Morris v. Mason, 43 La. Ann. 590, 9 So. 776 (1891).
17. Bethlehem Supply Co. v. Pan-Southern Petroleum Corp., 207 La. 149, 20
So.2d 737 (1945) ; State ex rel. Porterie v. Smith, 184 La. 263, 166 So. 72 (1936) ;
State ex rel. Morris v. Mason, 43 La. Ann. 590, 9 So. 776 (1891). The single ex-
ception to this rule is found in three cases and illustrated by the Mason case,
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Journal as to compliance with any of these provisions is con-
clusive proof that their requirement of a Journal entry showing
compliance has been violated and therefore invalidates the act. 8
The legislative procedures provided by the Louisiana Constitu-
tion which do not require that the fact of compliance be proved
by a Journal entry are: (1) that the time for introducing bills
without special permission is limited to the first twenty-one days
of a regular session ;19 (2) that revenue and appropriation bills
must originate in the House of Representatives ;20 (3) that every
act must be read on three different days in each House, and at
least once in full;21 (4) that every act must be reported by a
committee of each House ;22 and (5) that each act must be re-
ferred to the legislative bureau before it is advanced to a third
reading in the House in which it did not originate.23 Here also
the Journals are conclusive where either compliance or non-com-
pliance is shown.24 However, where the Journals are silent as to
any of these procedures the courts conclusively presume com-
pliance and uphold the challenged act.25
In view of the clearly mandatory language of the Constitu-
tion that "every bill shall be read on three different days in
each house, '2 6 the court was correct in disregarding the de-
where the question involved the introduction of daily editions of a journal to con-
tradict the journal as permanently published and promulgated. There the court
commented that "no extrinsic proof is admissible to contradict the facts which are
established by the journals; but fraud, error, mistake, or the improper exercise of
judgment, on the part of a state agent or representative, existing intrinsically, may
be shown.
"This is not a question of what proof is furnished by the journals, as contra-
distinguished from other proof of a given state of facts; but it is a question of the
journals being, in themselves, a correct exposition of the facts as they happened.
"We think that for such a purpose the evidence is admissible, and was prop-
erly admitted." State ex rel. Morris v. Mason, 43 La. Ann. 590, 616, 9 So. 776,
781 (1891).
Caillouet v. Laiche, 105 La. 84, 29 So. 700 (1901) (here the enrolled bill was
admitted to show lack of concurrence by one House in an amendment which was
included in the promulgated act) ; Hollingsworth v. Thompson, 45 La. Ann. 222,
12 So. 1 (1893) (quoted State ex tel. Morris v. Mason, supra, on the admission
of quasi-official daily journal records).
18. Wall v. Close, 203 La. 345, 14 So.2d 19 (1943) ; State er rel. Caillouet v.
Laiche, 105 La. 84, 29 So. 700 (1901).
19. LA. CONST. art. III, § 8.
20. Id. § 22.
21. Id. § 24.
22. Ibid.
23. Id. § 31.
24. See note 17 supra.
25. Wall v. Close, 203 La. 345, 14 So.2d 19 (1943) ; State v. Bauman, 148 La.
743, 87 So. 732 (1921) ; State v. Joseph, 139 La. 734, 72 So. 188 (1916) ; Hollings-
worth v. Thompson, 45 La. Ann. 222, 12 So. 1 (1893).
26. LA. CONST. art. III, § 24.
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fendant's argument that the provision is directory.27 The only
difficulty with the opinion is that the court failed to indicate
upon what evidence it based its decision. Although the "three
different days" requirement is one of those which need not be
proved by a Journal entry, in the instant case the Journal did
show that the act had been read on only two days in the Senate. 28
Since the Journal is conclusive proof of the legislative proceed-
ings,29 the act is invalid, and the court correctly ignored de-
fendant's argument that the presumption of compliance should
control. The failure of the court to indicate that the fatal in-
firmity was proved by a Journal entry is important because if
the Journal had not shown a violation, the court would have
had to presume conclusively that the bill had been read on three
days, and uphold the act.8 0
Edwin L. Blewer, Jr.
OBLIGATIONS - OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE
Defendant, a resident of Webster Parish, made a written
offer to the plaintiff, a roofing contractor in Shreveport, for
certain repairs to be made on the defendant's home. No definite
time for acceptance was stated, but the offer provided that the
acceptance could be made either in writing or by commencing
the performance. Because the work was to be done on credit,
it was mutually understood that the plaintiff would have to ob-
tain a report on the defendant's credit rating before any con-
tract could be consummated. The day after receiving a favorable
credit report, and ten days after receiving the offer, the plain-
tiff sent his men and two trucks loaded with materials to the
home of the defendant for the purpose of commencing perform-
ance. Upon arrival, the employees found that the defendant
had engaged a third party to repair the roof. In a suit for breach
of contract, the district court found that there was never a con-
27. For other cases in which acts were invalidated for failure to follow the
legislative procedure prescribed by the Louisiana Constitution, see State ex rel.
Caillouet v. Laiche, 105 La. 84, 29 So. 700 (1901) (failure to concur in amendment
as required by article III, § 26) ; Succession of Sala, 50 La. Ann. 1009, 24 So.
674 (1897) and Succession of Givanovich, 50 La. Ann. 625, 24 So. 679 (1897)
(revenue bill did not originate in House of Representatives as required by article
III, § 22).
28. LOUISIANA SENATE JOURNAL 1690, 1692, 1875, 1876 (17th regular session
1954).
29. See note 17 supra.
30. See note 25 supra.
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